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DIRECTING A VERDICT FOR PLAINTIFF IN
RES IPSA LOQUITUR CASES
The doctrine of res ipsa-loquitur has been greatly expanded,
and today constitutes an important branch of the law of torts
and evidence., In the course of its development, however, many
difficult problems have arisen,2 and in their solution the authori-
ties have not agreed.3 One of these controversial subjects is this:
assuming that the plaintiff has established his cases as falling
within the doctrine, i. e., where it has been shown that (1) the
accident was of a kind which, in the absence of proof of some
external cause, does not ordinarily happen without negligence,
(2) the defendant owned, operated, maintained, or was respon-
sible for the management of the thing doing the damage, and
(3) the defendant possessed superior knowledge or means of in-
formation as to the cause of the injury,4 should the court, under
any circumstances, direct a verdict in favor of the plaintiff?
I.
In some jurisdictions, the courts have held that in a res ipsb
loquitur case the burden of proof, i. e., the burden of establish-
ing to the satisfaction of the jury by a preponderance of the cred-
ible evidence that there had been no negligence whatever, and
that the damage or injury had been occasioned by an inevitable
casualty, or some~ other cause for which the defendant was not
responsible, was shifted upon the defendant.2 This view is in-
accurate, because the "risk of non-persuasion" of the jury never
shifts.6 No "fixed rule of law" can be said to shift,7 and it is an
1. See for problem in generat, note, 56 A. L. R. 1021 (1928); note, 53
A. L. R. 1494 (1928) ; note, 23 A. L. R. 484 (1923) ; note, 22 A. L. R. 1471
(1923); note, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 601 (1908); comment, 13 Geo. L. J. 373
(1925); comment, 7 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 415 (1929); comment, 54 N. J.
L. J. 349 (1931).
2. Such issues as to when the rule will apply, whether a plaintiff who has
pleaded specific acts of negligence may rely on the rule, whether the doctrine
applies to the master-servant relationship, etc.
3. Supra, note 1.
4. 5 Wigmore, On Evidence (2d ed. 1923) sec. 2509, 1. c. 498; Kaemmer-
ling v. Athletic Mining & Smelting Co., 2 F. (2d) 574 (C. C. A. 8, 1924).
5. Price v. Met. St. Ry. Co., 220 Mo. 435, 119 S. W. 932 (1909) ; Lemon
v. Chanslor, 68 Mo. 340, 30 Am. Rep. 799 (1878), overruled by McCloskey v.
Koplar, 329 Mo. 527, 46 S. W. (2d) 557 (1932); Meier v. Penn. R. R. Co.,
64 Pa. St. 225, 3 Am. Rep. 581 (1870) ; Feitl v. Chicago City R. R. Co., 113
Ill. App. 381 (1899) ; Lincoln Traction Co. v. Webb, 73 Neb. 136, 102 N. W.
258 (1906); Firebaugh v. Seattle Electric Co., 40 Wash. 658, 82 P. 995,
2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 836 (1905).
6. 5 Wigmore, On Evidence (2d. ed. 1923) sec. 2489, 1. c. 448; McClosky
v. Koplar, supra, note 5.
7. Demeules v. Jewel Tea Co., 103 Minn. 150, 114 N. W. 733, 14 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 954, 123 Am. St. Rep. 315 (1908); Terryberry v. Woods, 69 Vt. 94,
37 Atl. 246 (1896) ; Wigmore, On Evidence (2d. ed. 1923) sec. 2489.
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elementary principle that the burden of proof is on the party
who substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue, whether
he be nominally plaintiff or defendant.8
When the defendant has the burden of proof, and then refuses
to assume the duty of affirmatively proving his non-liability by
coming forward with explaining evidence, it becomes the duty
of the court to direct a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.9
Ii.
The vast majority of the cases hold that the burden of proof
in a res ipsa loquitur case remains with the plaintiff as in any
other cause in which an affirmative issue is pleaded.10 If the de-
fendant then produces evidence of his due care and proper pre-
caution, the court should instruct the jury that if after consider-
ing such explanation, on the whole case and on all the issues as
to negligence, injury, and damage, the evidence still preponder-
ates in favor of the plaintiff, he is entitled to recover, otherwise
not. 1
When the defendant, however, refuses to introduce any excul-
patory evidence, some courts speak of the doctrine as creating
a presumption; others give it the dignity of a permissible infer-
ence, making no distinction between this situation and when the
defendant comes forward with evidence.12
The difficulty has arisen in part from a confusion of terms and
a failure to draw the proper distinction between them. 3 A pre-
sumption is a conclusion which the law deduces from a given
state of facts.14 It has a technical force or weight, 15 and the jury,
in the absence of evidence to the contrary is compelled to reach
8. Walker v. Carpenter, 144 N. C. 674, 57 S. E. 461 (1907); McCall v.
Alexander, 81 S. C. 131, 61 S. E. 1106 (1908); Bank v. Kirby, 175 S. W.
926 (1915).
9. As said in Coffman v. Spokane Chronicle Pub. Co., 65 Wash. 1, 8, 117
Pac. 596 (1911), "The question whether the burden of proof rests with a
plaintiff or defendant may be determined by ascertaining which party with-
out evidence, will be compelled to submit to an adverse judgment on the
pleadings"; for other cases, see Evidence, Dec. Dig. key no. 90.
10. 24 R. C. L. sec. 161; note, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 527 (1908); note, 59
A. L. R. 486 (1929); note, L. R. A. 1916 A, 930.
11. When the defendant introduces sufficient evidence to take the case to
the jury, the problem is relatively simple; see for example, Lyles v. Bran-
non Carbonating Co., 140 N. C. 25, 52 S. E. 234 (1905); Ryan v. St. Paul
Union Depot Co., 168 Minn. 287, 210 N. W. 32 (1926).
12. See for some general discussion, note 53 A. L. R. 1494 (1928).
13. Supra, note 12, 1. c. 1494-5.
14. Thomas v. Electric R. R. Co., 169 Cal. 658, 147 Pac. 972 (1915);
Ensel v. Lumber Ins. Co. of New York, 88 Ohio St. 269, 102 N. E. 955 (1913).
15. McCagg v. Heacock, 34 Ill. 476, 85 Am. Dec. 327 (1864).
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that conclusion.16 If the opponent offers evidence to the contrary,
(sufficient to satisfy the judges requirement of some evidence)
the presumption disappears as a rule of law.17
An inference, however,, is a deduction which the jury makes
from the facts proved, without an express direction of law to
that effect. 8 It is nothing more than a permissible deduction
from the evidence, and the jury is at liberty to find the ultimate
fact one way or the other as they are impressed by the testi-
mony.' 9
The leading case in support of the rule which limits the force
of the doctrine to a permissible inference is Sweeney v. Erying,2
in which Justice Pitney said:
"Res ispa. loquitur means that the facts of the occurrence
warrant the inference of negligence, not that they compel
such an inference; that they furnish circumstantial evidence
where direct evidence of it may be lacking, but it is evidence
to be weighed, not necessarily to be accepted as sufficient,
that they call for explanation or rebuttal, not necessarily
that they require it, that they make a case to be decided by
the jury, not that they forestall the verdict. Res ips, lo-
quitur, where it applies, does not convert the defendant's
general issue into an affirmative defense. When all the evi-
dence is in, the question for the jury is whether the prepon-
derance is with the plaintiff."
The rule as h6re applied, strictly speaking, merely takes the
place of evidence as affecting the burden of proceeding with the
case, and is not itself evidence.2 1 The plaintiff, having at the out-
set both the burden of proof and the burden of evidence, 22 has
by establishing a res ipsa loquitur case, satisfied the latter duty,
and has taken his case past the judge and to the jury.2 3 The
16. Cogdell v. R. R. Co., 132 N. C. 852, 854, 44 S. E. 618 (1903); as
Mansfield said, "It stands good till answered, and if not answered at all, it
thereby becomes conclusive." Rex v. Almon (5 Burr. 2686, 1770), 98 Eng.
Rep. 411.
17. 5 Wigmore, On Evidence (2d ed. 1923) see. 2490.
18. Keithley v. Hettinger, 133 Minn. 36, 157 N. W. 891 (1916); supra,
note 17.
19. Williamson v. Salt Lake & 0. R. R. Co., 52 Utah 84, 172 Pac. 680
(1918), and cases cited.
20. 228 U. S. 233, 57 L. ed. 815, 33 S. Ct. 416 (1913).
21. Ryan v. St. Paul Union Depot Co., 168 Minn. 287, 288, 219 N. W. 32
(1926).
22. Harke v. Haase, 75 S. W. (2d) 1003 (Mo. 1934).
23. Wigmore defines the burden of evidence as "the duty of producing
evidence to satisfy the judge." 5 Wigmore, On Evidence (2d. ed. 1923) sec.
2489 (b); Ragland's concurring opinion in McClosky v. Koplar, supra, note
5, 1. c. 564.
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defendant, therefore, is not required, as a matter of law, to pro-
duce an explanation, and may decline to offer evidence at the
peril of the jury inferring negligence on his part.24
The minority view is that the proof of the accident and the
surrounding circumstances give rise to a presumption of negli-
gence, and impose upon the defendant the duty of introducing
some explanatory evidence.2 If the defendant fails to come for-
ward with evidence, it becomes the duty of the court to direct
a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.26 The only question for the
jury then to decide is the amount of damages to be awarded.2 7
Such presumption, however, need not be overcome by a prepon-
derance of the evidence to avoid a directed verdict, but merely
requires some proof, which will, at the least, have a tendency
either to rebut or meet the presumption thus raised.28
This presumptive theory has been followed in some jurisdic-
tions in certain types of res ipsa loquitur cases and not in
others.2 In Iowa the rule is that upon proof that a person has
been injured while a passenger on a train and where the attend-
ing circumstances indicate that the injury would not likely have
occurred had the carrier exercised the care exacted by law, negli-
24. White v. Hines, 182 N. C. 275, 109 S. E. 31 (1921); Zoccolillo v. Ore-
gon R. R. Co., 53 Utah 39, 177 Pac. 201 (1918).
25. Colorado Springs & Interurban R. R. Co. v. Reese, 69 Colo. 1, 169
Pac. 572 (1917); Fitch v. Mason City & Co. L. Traction Co., 124 Iowa 665,
100 N. W. 618 (1904); Alabama & V. R. R. Co. v. Groome, 97 Miss. 201, 52
So. 703 (1910).
26. Halterman v. Hansard, 4 Ohio App. 268, 22 Ohio C. C. N. S. 443
(1915); Levine v. Brooklyn, Q. C. & Suburban R. R. Co., 119 N. Y. Supp.
315 (1909).
27. Moglia v. Nassau Electric R. R. Co., 111 N. Y. Supp. 70 (1908).
28. In Plumb v. Richmond Light & R. R. Co., 233 N. Y. 285, 135 N. E.
504 (1922), the court said, "Shifting the burden of explanation or of going
on with the case does not shift the burden of proof"; supra, note 12, 1. c.
1510 where the effect of the presumptive theory is discussed it is said, "the
burden of establishing the ultimate fact of negligence abides with the plain-
tiff to the end of the case; the sole function of the doctrine is to raise a
prima facie presumption of negligence from a given state of facts, which
will become conclusive if not rebutted by opposing evidence."
29. in Glowacke v. Northwestern Ohio R. R. & Power Co., 116 Ohio St.
451, 157 N. E. 21, 53 L. R. A. 1486 (1927), which accords with the view
that res ipsa loquitur is a mere permissible inference, the court concedes
that in carrier and passenger cases where the rule applies, the carrier would
be required to offer evidence to rebut the inference raised against him. The
basis for this is largely explained by the fact that when the court departs
from their general ruling and hold in a particular case that the doctrine
gives rise to a presumption of negligence, there is a statute which requires
the "utmost degree of care" as regards such action, and the court, therefore,
is merely attempting to give greater force to the substantive law. Supra,
note 12, 1. c. 1506-10.
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gence on its part is presumed. 0 In some states, this has been
made the law by statute.31 Such was the ruling in a United
States Supreme Court case of this nature,32 althought that court
strongly favors the theory that ordinarily the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur is a mere permissible inference. A similar doc-
trine has been announced where a wire carrying a charge of
electric current high enough to endanger human life becomes
out of order, broken, etc., and someone comes in contact there-
with and is injured.34
In Missouri, a marked change in the res ipsa loquitur doctrine
took place when the Supreme Court decided the case of McClos-
key v. Koplar.35 The court held that it was improper to instruct
the jury that in such a case the burden of proof rested upon the
defendant. A long line of previous cases had upheld instructions
which tended to bring about this result.36 The majority of the
court discussed the distinction between the burden of proof and
the burden of evidence, and the shifting of the burden of evi-
dence from the plaintiff to the defendant and from the defendant
to the plaintiff, and so on. They failed, however, to state clearly
whether the defendant must, as a matter of law, come forward
with evidence in the first instance, or whether a failure to do
so would merely warrant the jury in drawing an inference of
negligence. Justice Ragland, in his concurring opinion, strongly
stressed the latter view as being the proper function of the doc-
trine.3
Subsequent Missouri cases have not been directly faced with
the issue of determining whether the doctrine gives rise to a
presumption or an inference when the defendant fails to come
forward with evidence.3" In the majority of them, however,
there is dicta to the effect that the purpose of the doctrine, under
all circumstances, is to take the case past the judge to the jury,
30. Dorn v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R. Co., 154 Iowa 140, 134 N. W. 855
(1912).
31. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. R. Co. v. Armbrust, 121 Ark. 35, 181 S. W.
131 (1917).
32. Gleeson v. Virginia Midland R. R. Co., 140 U. S. 435, 11 S. Ct. 859,
35 L. ed. 458 (1891).
33. Supra, note 20, and cases cited.
34. Haynes v. Raleigh Gas Co., 114 N. C. 203, 19 S. E. 344, 26 L. R. A.
810 (1894) ; contra, Glowacke v. Northwestern Ohio Ry. & Power Co., supra,
note 29.
35. 329 Mo. 527, 46 S. W. (2d) 557 (1932).
36. Supra, note 4, and cases cited.
37. McClosky v. Koplar, supra, note 35, 1. c. 564.
38. That is, where the defendant failed to introduce any evidence, and
the plaintiff asked the court to direct a verdict in his favor.
Washington University Open Scholarship
and it is then within the power of the jury to draw the infer-
ence89
Such was the language in Givens v. Spalding Cloak Co.,4°
where the Court of Appeals said, "There appears to be in the
evidence, reasonable foundation for the jury, if it so believes
and finds, to draw an inference of negligence. It is not an infer-
ence which the law itself draws, but it is an inference of fact
which, if properly supported by evidence, the law permits the
jury to find if they deem it proper from the evidence before
them."
In Glasco Electric Co. v. Union Electric Light & Power Co.,41
the Supreme Court said, "When the doctrine is applicable, it con-
stitutes an exception or qualification to the general rule that
negligence is not to be presumed, but must be affirmatively
proven, and operates as a substitute for specific proof of negli-
gence so as to make a prima facie case, which, if unexplained
carries the question of negligence to the jury, and is sufficient
to warrant and sustain a finding of negligence on the part of
the defendant."
In Hartnett v. May Department Stores Co.,4 2 however, al-
though the defendant came forward with evidence, the language
accepted by the Court of Appeals leaves no doubt that they were
considering the doctrine as creating a presumption of negligence.
Commissioner Sutton, whose opinion was affirmed by the court,
said, "It thus appears that the presumption arising under the
res ipsa loquitur rule-is not a mere inference such as may be
drawn or not by the jury as they see fit, but it is a rebuttable
presumption of law."
1IL
Not only would it be more practical, but the maxim of res ipsa
loquitur should, as a matter of theory and sound reasoning, give
rise to a presumption of negligence.
The term presumption finds its place in the expression of legal
concepts as the result of common experience with things and
men. Observation has taught us that we have like results when
we have like causes operating under like conditions. The same
experience leads us to conclude that like causes have been operat-
39. Harke v. Haase, 335 Mo. 1104, 75 S. W. (2d) 1001 (1934); Sakowski
v. Baird, 334 Mo. 951, 69 S. W. (2d) 649 (1933); Noce v. St. Louis-San
Francisco R. R. Co., 85 S. W. (2d) 637 (Mo. 1933).
40. 63 S. W. (2d) 819, 826 (Mo. 1933).
41. 61 S. W. (2d) 955, 957 (Mo. 1933).
42. 85 S. W. (2d) 644, 648, (Mo. 1935).
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ing if under like conditions we get like results. 43 Presumptions,
therefore, have played an important and useful part in reaching,
expedient and efficient judgments, especially in such situations as,
conditions of bodily health or strength," corporate existence,4
personal46 or legal status, 47 occupation, 48 the course of business
dealings between persons,4" etc.
In the res ipsa loquitur cases, powerful and dangerous agen-
cies, which, if properly constructed and managed do not endanger
human life, have in some manner caused serious injuries to an
unsuspecting victim. 0 The nature of the accident, plus the fact
that the plaintiff is not in a position to know the exact manner
in which the defendant has been negligent, constitute the two
essential elements upon which presumptions are based, i. e., (1)
common experience and inherent probability that a certain fact
is true, and (2) a lack of direct evidence by which that contention
may be proved.51
In a word it may be said, that to make it incumbent upon the
defendant in a res ipsa loquitur case, as a matter of law, to come
forward with sufficient explaining evidence to remove the pre-
sumption of negligence which should be raised, would be to sub-
stitute a sensible for a mechanistic approach to this problem.
IV.
There is another basis upon which some courts will, in any
type of case, direct a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. This may
arise when the facts and surrounding circumstances disclosed
are of such a nature that the court can say that reasonable men
would not differ as to the conclusion to be drawn therefrom,
and that a verdict in favor of the defendant would be set aside
as being against the weight of evidence.52
43. O'Dea v. Amodeo, 170 At]. 486 (1934); see for good discussions on
nature and purpose of presumptions, comment, 14 Boston U. L. Rev. I. c.
442 (1934) ; note, 22 Mich. L. Rev. 207 (1924) ; note, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 906
(1931).
44. Powell v. Travelers Protective Ass'n of America, 160 Mo. App. 571,
140 S. W. 939 (1911).
45. Anglo-Californian Bank v. Field, 146 Cal. 644, 80 P. 1080 (1905).
46. Texas & P. R. R. Co. v. Lacey, 185 F. 225 (C. C. A. 5, 1911).
47. Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Washko, 231 F. 42 (C. C. A. 2, 1916).
48. Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. v. Hodge, 181 Mo. App. 232, 167
S. W. 1186 (1914).
49. Hastings v. Brooklyn Life Ins. Co., 138 N. Y. 473, 34 N. E. 289
(1893).
50. Hughes v. Harbor & Suburban Bldg. & Say. Asso., 115 N. Y. Supp.
320 (1909).
51. Read citations, supra, note 42.
52. Webber v. Axtell, 110 Minn. 52, 124 N. W. 453 (1910) ; Marshall v.
Grosse Clothing Co., 184 Ill. 421, 56 N. E. 807; the court in Keithley v. Het-
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The majority view, however, is that the weight to be given
to the evidence, under all circumstances, is for the determina-
tion of the jury.2 If the jury returns a verdict contrary to what
the court believes the evidence merits, this verdict will be set
aside as being against the weight of evidence. 4
Applying this general rule to the res ipsa loquitur situation,
its impractibility becomes apparent. Whenever there is a con-
stant recurrence of certain results and certain factors are always
in operation, in the absence of direct proof that these factors are
present, such results are circumstantial evidence that they have
been active.5  In the res ipsa loquitur case, it is essential that the
nature of the accident is one which does not ordinarily occur in
the absence of negligence.5 This is circumstantial evidence,57
which has weight, and the jury, even when the defendant pro-
duces an explanation, cannot give it less consideration than the
trial judge believes it merits.5 8 Therefore, whenever the jury
fails to draw an inference of negligence when the defendant fails
to come forward with the least evidence, this verdict will be
against the weight of evidence, because the circumstantial evi-
dence resulting from the nature of the case, necessarily prepon-
derates over the nothing which the defendant has produced. It
would then become the duty of the court to set this verdict aside,
or to assume an inconsistent position. To allow a case to go to
the jury when only one conclusion can be accepted is an idle
ceremony.5 9 To remedy this particular defect when the defen-
dant refuses to explain, the courts could follow the presumptive
theory. To remedy this entire problem, the courts should aban-
tinger, 133 Minn. 36, 39, 157 N. W. 897 (1916), a res ipsa loquitur case,
said: "Unless the facts and circumstances disclosed are so full and convinc-
ing that the court can say that reasonable minds would not differ as to the
conclusion to be drawn therefrom, the question as to the negligence, is for
the jury, not the court."
53. Foster v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 233 S. W. 499 (Mo. 1921) ; Laf-
ferty v. Kansas City Casualty Co., 229 S. W. 750 (Mo. 1921).
.54. Linderman v. Nolan, 16 Okl. 352, 83 Pac. 796 (1905).
55. Wigmore, P-inciples of Jndicial Proof (2d ed. 1931) sec. 6 et seq.
56. Supra, note 3.
57. As was said in Sweeney v. Erving, supra note 20, "that the facts of
the occurrence--furnish circumstantial evidence of negligence where direct
evidence of it may be lacking."
58. In Herries v. Bond, 84 S. W. (2d) 153 (Mo. 1935), the defendant
introduced very little evidence, and the plaintiff relied solely on the occur-
rence of the accident. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant.
Thereupon the plaintiff duly filed her motion for a new trial, and the court
sustained it on the grounds that the verdict of the jury was against the
weight of evidence.
59. Heath v. Jaquith, 68 Me. 438 (1878).
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don the steadfast rule of not directing a verdict in favor of the
party bearing the burden of proof, under any circumstances.
The propriety of the trial court's refusal to direct a verdict
in favor of the party bearing the burden of proof, when it re-
alizes in advance that an adverse judgment will be set aside, is
unfortunately sanctioned by countless precedents. The grounds
on which such refusal seems to be based are (1) that it is with-
in the sole province of the jury to pass upon the evidence, and
the credibility of the witnesses, and (2) that when a court sets
aside a verdict on the same evidence which it considered when
it refused to direct a verdict, it is merely exercising its time-
honored privilege of changing its own mind as to the weight
that is be accorded to the evidence. 60
As to the latter reason, it seems absurd that the court should
be prevented from acting correctly in the first instance, and be
denied the power to direct a verdict when it realizes a contrary
one will be set aside, merely in order to preserve the illogical
right of "changing its mind." Nor does it seem that the other
justification is basically sound.61 The court, in considering the
evidence before verdict instead of after, is not depriving the
jury of any of its duties. 62 It cannot truthfully be said that a
person is denied any of those rights assured by trial by jury if
he has a verdict directed against him under these circumstances.
He may ask for a new trial, or appeal the same as if the case
had gone to the jury.63
A well known author correctly states the matter thus :04
"The basic principle underlying the cases which deny the
court the right to instruct the jury in favor of the party
having the burden of proof, is, as already indicated, that
the jury has the right to disbelieve all the witnesses even
though the facts to which they testify are uncontroverted
and inherently credible, and the witnesses unimpeached.
60. Luhrs v. Brooklyn Heights R. R. Co., 42 N. Y. Supp. 606 (1897);
comment, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 453 (1897); comment, U. of Mo. Law Bull.
22 Law Series 46 (1919).
61. Comment, 9 Central L. J. 102 (1879); note, 11 Mich. L. Rev. 198(1913); supra, note 58, except the Luhrs case.
62. Inhabitants of Wellington v. Inhabitants of Corinna, 104 Me. 252,
254, 71 Atl. 889 (1908) ; in Morgan v. Durfee, 69 Mo. 469 (1879), Sherwood
C. J. observed that it was not usurping the power of the jury for the court
to direct a verdict in favor of either party, but rather it was a duty which
it should exercise, and which it often shirked. He speaks of this as a power
seldom used "owing to a pitiful and powerful weakness in the dorsal region."
63. Meyer v. Houck, 85 Iowa 319, 52 N. W. 235 (1892).
64. Sunderland, Directing a Verdict for the Party Having the Burden
of Proof (1913) 11 Mich. L. Rev. 198, 206.
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Why the jury should be given any such license is hard to
understand. Juries cannot be permitted to exercise blind
and unreasoning power to oppress litigants. They must con-
duct themselves as sensible and reasonable men. They can-
not be suffered to base verdicts on caprice, conjecture, pas-
sion or prejudice."
V.
In summary, it has been shown that a verdict will, in some
jurisdictions, be directed for the plaintiff in a res ipsa loquitur
case in the following situations: (1) Where the burden of proof
is shifted upon the defendant, and the defendant refuses to
assume it by coming forward with explanatory evidence; (2)
Where the doctrine gives rise to a presumption of negligence
and the defendant fails to produce sufficient evidence to remove
it; and (3) When the evidence is of such a nature that the court
can say that a verdict in favor of the defendant must be set
aside as being against the weight of evidence. It is submitted
that the latter two rulings, although not the prevailing law, are
more consistent and in harmony with logic and sound reasoning.
These problems, however, are far from settled. Their develop-
ment has been largely a process of judicial interpretation of
past precedents. It is hoped, therefore, that in the course of
time, the courts will come to recognize what seems to be the
more practical and sensible solutions.
MoRRis J. GARDEN.
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